A recent network meta-analysis by Zhu and colleagues reported in the Shanghai Archives of Psychiatry compared two different comparators (psychological placebo and waitlist control) in trials assessing the effectiveness of cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) for the treatment of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). CBT was superior to both of these control conditions, but psychological placebo was superior to waitlist. However, we argue that the term 'psychological placebo' is a misnomer because the impossibility of effectively blinding participants to treatment allocation in CBT trials makes it impossible to control for placebo effects. This failure to blind participants and therapists -and the resultant high risk of bias -was the main reason Zhu and colleagues found that the overall quality of the evidence supporting the conclusion that CBT is effective for GAD is poor. This is a general problem in all psychotherapy trials, which suffer from well-documented methodological and conceptual problems that prevent adequate placebo control and undermine casual inference. We discuss these problems and suggest potential solutions. We conclude that, while it may be difficult to remove potential bias in randomized controlled trials of psychotherapy, we can improve on the status quo by integrating basic science within applied trials to adjust for these biases and, thus, improve the strength of the causal inferences.
Introduction
A recent network meta-analysis by Zhu and colleagues [1] compared two different comparators (psychological placebo and waitlist control) in trials assessing the effectiveness of cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) for the treatment of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). CBT was found to be superior to waitlist control and (to a lesser extent) to psychological placebo. Moreover, psychological placebo was also superior to waitlist control, which might be interpreted as evidence of the need to control for the non-specific effects of therapy, such as therapist and researcher contact time. However, we argue that 'psychological placebo' is a misnomer as it fails to meet key criteria for controlling for placebo effects.
Zhu and colleagues also identified problems with study quality in this literature. Using the GRADE criteria for study quality (http://www.gradeworkinggroup.org/ intro.htm) developed by the Cochrane Collaboration, they found that the quality of the evidence supporting the conclusion that CBT was effective was poor. [2] Eight of the 12 studies they identified were classified as at 'high risk of bias' and the quality of evidence as a whole was classified as 'moderate', suggesting that the evidence for the effectiveness of CBT for GAD is not yet robust. This is surprising given the confidence many practitioners have in the effectiveness of CBT. However, the evidence-base for psychotherapy as a whole suffers from well-documented methodological and conceptual problems that prevent adequate placebo control and, Shanghai Archives of Psychiatry, 2015, Vol. 27, No. 3 • 144 • thus, undermine the strength of casual inferences. [3] [4] [5] This commentary discusses these problems and suggests potential solutions.
Causal inference, placebo effects, and the importance
of blinding Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are the gold standard for causal inference, and underpin evidencebased practice. [6] Concealed random allocation ensures both measured and unmeasured confounders are randomly distributed across treatment arms. The control condition or comparator excludes changes that are not caused by the intervention, such as natural recovery over time, and placebo effects (i.e., differences in outcomes due to psychological factors such as expectancy of improvement). Placebo effects are powerful, producing clinically important improvements that correlate with expectations of improvement. [3] Blinding of participants, clinicians, and researchers to treatment allocation prevents the introduction of bias in the reporting and assessment of outcomes.
In medical trials, placebo effects are controlled for by means of an identical but 'non-active' comparator, such as a sugar pill for antidepressants or sham surgery for deep brain stimulation. The patient can be blinded as to whether they are in the active or placebo condition, and expectancy of improvement can be held constant across both treatment arms. Placebo effects can then be confidently excluded as a potential cause of any observed treatment effect. However, RCTs can yield biased results if they fail to meet these standards for blinding. [6] Results of RCTs may be biased by psychological factors, such as a desire among participants or researchers for the trial to 'work' (demand characteristics) influencing outcome assessment, [4] or when participants self-report outcomes in a manner which they think desirable to the trial team. Researchers may treat patients in the active and comparator arms differently, or complete the outcome assessment in a biased way. Blinding of patients and researchers is therefore crucial to ensure unbiased results. [7] The extent and success of blinding often depends on the type of comparator; for example, it is relatively easy to blind all participants and researchers when a sugar pill is used as the comparator, but it may not be possible to blind the surgical team when comparing an actual surgery and a sham surgery.
The problems with psychological placebos
The purpose of a placebo is to control for the psychological effects of administering a treatment. [3] To achieve this, the placebo must appear identical to the active treatment but be missing the 'active ingredient', and the patient must be blinded. These conditions do not map well to psychotherapy. CBT targets psychological processes, so disentangling placebo effects from treatment effects is challenging. It is difficult to create an 'inactive' but comparable psychological control, as the more similar the psychological placebo appears to CBT the more 'active' it is likely to be. Relaxation therapy or supportive consultation are often used as control conditions for CBT trials, but these may still have therapeutic effects. Finally, and critically, it is impossible to blind participants and therapists, as CBT involves active engagement with its theoretical rationale. [4] We concur with others who suggest that the concept of a 'psychological placebo' is both methodologically and conceptually flawed. [3] Lack of blinding is arguably the main cause of the high risk of bias in CBT trials. None of the 12 studies identified in Zhu and colleagues' review had blinded the treating therapists or the participants to their treatment allocation so the risk of bias for these items was rated as 'high'. All of the studies had blinded assessors of various outcome measures, but in 6 of the 12 studies the main outcome measure was based on the results of a self-reported scale completed by the participant (i.e., it was not assessed by the blinded assessor). It is possible, although not straightforward, to blind outcome assessment. However, even when the assessors are effectively blinded to treatment allocation, bias could still occur due to demand characteristics if patients are aware of their treatment allocation and answer the blinded assessor's questions in a biased manner. Thus failure to control for differences in patient expectations, and demand characteristics, coupled with subjective self-reported outcome assessment, introduces a high risk of bias.
In the studies reviewed by Zhu and colleagues, psychological placebo was operationalized as either one-to-one supportive consultation or general group discussions of psychological problems.
[1] While 'psychological placebo' is a misnomer due to the inability to blind trial participants to their treatment allocation, controlling for non-specific factors such as therapist contact time and general supportive discussions is useful when assessing the effectiveness of the specific components of CBT such as exposure therapy and reappraisal. However, such studieswhich may underestimate the beneficial effects of CBT -should be relabeled as trials comparing different psychological interventions rather than as 'placebocontrolled' trials.
Given these difficulties, it is unsurprising that the majority of CBT trials use comparators such as no treatment, waitlist, or treatment as usual. Of these, treatment as usual is arguably the most informative (and conservative), because it addresses the important pragmatic question "Is CBT more effective than current best treatment?". However, the majority of studies reviewed by Zhu and colleagues used waitlist control. In a recent network meta-analysis patients randomized to waitlist control were found to do worse than those randomized to no treatment, [8] suggesting that waitlist may act as a nocebo (i.e., having an adverse effect on patients). Patients randomized to waitlist may have negative expectations of improvement as they are placed in a state of stasis rather than actively receiving
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What can be done to improve the evidence-base
for CBT? Does it matter that the evidence for CBT is not robust according to the GRADE criteria? More importantly, does it matter that we cannot make causal inferences about the effectiveness of CBT because of the possibility that observed effects are due to placebo (and/or nocebo) effects, or other biases arising from lack of blinding? Pragmatically, the evidence that CBT is superior to treatment as usual, irrespective of how, may be sufficient to guide the decision to support a treatment. However, the evidence reviewed by Zhu and colleagues is not ideal for addressing either of these points because it did not compare CBT to treatment as usual; comparisons with waitlist likely overestimate effectiveness, while comparisons with psychological controls likely underestimate effectiveness.
The evidence for CBT from traditional RCT designs may never fully satisfy the most robust GRADE criteria. However, causal inferences about the effectiveness of CBT could be strengthened in at least three ways. First, by going back to the laboratory to understand the basic science questions of how CBT and placebo effects work. Second, by including measures of bias in controlled clinical trials to allow post-hoc adjustment for potential confounding in treatment effects. Third, by using sophisticated multi-arm analyses to assess the relative effects of components of interventions, and metaregression to explore how the level of risk of biases influences treatment effect.
A call for basic science
CBT is a complex intervention, comprising a range of behavioral and cognitive techniques. Elucidating which are 'active ingredients' and which are redundant is an important basic science question, with clear clinical application. Understanding the mechanisms of change can lead to improved and more efficient therapies by focusing on those components which work and removing those that do not, and can lead to new avenues for treatment, potentially increasing the psychological treatment toolkit.
One way to address basic questions of mechanism is to examine each component of CBT in isolation in the laboratory. [9] For example, the protocol for exposure therapy, a key behavioral technique used in CBT for anxiety disorders, was developed in the 1960s from the basic science of fear-extinction learning. The mechanism by which exposure to the fear stimulus (e.g., spiders, social situations) extinguishes the fear response and reduces anxiety is now well understood, and basic research continues to inform the optimization of related psychological therapies. [10] Mechanism studies could be routinely embedded within clinical trials, by incorporating measures of the psychological processes CBT is thought to target. This would be an efficient and cost-effective way to understand mechanisms. Basic science can also delineate the causal mechanisms by which placebos produce their effects. [3] The experimental pursuit of understanding the mechanisms of placebo effects will inform both our understanding of the active ingredients of current therapies and contribute to basic knowledge that can be used to maximize placebo effects to improve patient outcomes. More detailed understanding of placebo effects would also lead to the development of more precise measures of placebo effects which could be used to statistically adjust for these effects in RCTs (discussed below).
A sticking plaster (bandaid) for clinical trials
Can we control for bias introduced by inadequate blinding statistically? Repeated measures of expectancy and beliefs about the demands of the research throughout the trial would provide a means by which potential bias could be adjusted for. If such data were routinely collected, summary effect estimates could be adjusted in an evidence syntheses to account for these potential biases.
There are theoretical reasons why we might expect that treatment effects for CBT would persist longer than placebo effects. CBT targets thinking styles, so adopting longer-term follow-up assessments (i.e., after the active treatment is completed) as the primary outcome may increase confidence in the efficacy of CBT. Similarly, research into placebo effects of antidepressants suggests that placebo effects vary with severity, being greatest for mild depression and decreasing as the severity of the depressive symptoms of participants increases. [11] If this also holds for GAD, subgroup analyses based on the severity of GAD might indirectly inform causal inference. The more we understand about the mechanisms underlying placebo and CBT effects, the better we can design pragmatic clinical trials to overcome the limitations associated with lack of blinding.
Network meta-analysis and evidence synthesis
Treatment effects are relative, determined as much by the comparator as by the intervention. Network-meta analysis provides a powerful tool for comparing how treatment effects vary when different comparators are employed. To retain power in pairwise comparisons in traditional meta-analysis, different comparators (which can have very different effects on treatment effects) tend to be combined into a single control group, or separated as subgroups. Network meta-analysis goes beyond the traditional meta-analysis approach by additionally allowing indirect comparisons between the various control conditions, which can be quite useful. For example, this approach helped identify the nocebo Shanghai Archives of Psychiatry, 2015, Vol. 27, No. 3
• 146 • effects of waitlist control, which indirectly suggests that the treatment effects reported from trials using waitlist controls likely over-estimate the effectiveness of CBT. [8] One way to overcome issues of expectancy and lack of blinding is to compare the same therapy with one or more components added or removed, to assess whether or not the component(s) directly causes the treatment target. This approach should control for most forms of bias (with the possible exception of therapist blinding), as patients would expect to improve similarly in both arms (assuming they are naive to the missing ingredient). However, these types of comparison trials would require large numbers of patients to have sufficient statistical power to detect the potentially small treatment effects attributable to single techniques. Alternatively, if different trials used slightly different CBT protocols, network meta-analytic approaches might provide a means of assessing the relative effectiveness of these protocols and, thus, assess the effects of the CBT components that are different between the trials. Finally, network meta-analysis could also be used to estimate the direction and extent of bias caused by lack of blinding and to make appropriate adjustments in the final estimates of the effectiveness of CBT. [12] 
Closing remarks
In most treatment studies of CBT (and other psychotherapeutic interventions) strong causal inferences about effectiveness are not justified because of the possibility that observed effects are due to placebo (and/or nocebo) effects or other biases arising from lack of blinding. Addressing the basic science questions of how CBT and placebos work will provide a better understanding of what is causal in complex interventions. Such knowledge could lead to the development of more efficient or novel psychological interventions and to improved trial design. The better we understand placebo effects, the better we can assess and quantify them, allowing more precise measures of the placebo effect to be incorporated into clinical trials and adjusted for in statistical analyses. Similarly, we can include measures of the psychological processes thought to be targeted by CBT in clinical trials and assess how these measures change during the course of CBT treatment. Therefore, while it may be virtually impossible to remove potential bias in RCTs of psychotherapy that arise from the placebo effect and the lack of effective blinding, we can improve on the status quo by integrating basic science within applied trials to adjust for these biases and, thus, make stronger causal inferences.
